A hospital could informally admit a person for treatment for a mental disorder under section 131 of the Mental Health Act 1983 only with his consent. A person who has no capacity to consent or dissent or a guardian to consent on his behalf had to be admitted under the statutory procedures in the 1983 Act, otherwise the hospital was detaining him. Since the common law principle of necessity was excluded by the statutory provisions, the detention was unlawful'.
The judgment makes clear that the common law doctrine of necessity can apply only where the Mental Health Act 19832 does not apply.
On 19 December 1997 the NHS Executive wrote to all chief executives of NHS trusts, with copies to numerous medical and social services bodies, pointing out the enormous implications of this judgment for the management of dementia and learning disability. The Executive clarified the applicability of the judgment to existing patients as well as new ones, and advised managers of NHS trusts and nursing homes registered to take detained patients to review the position of existing inpatients who lack the capacity to consent.
ACUTE ADMISSIONS
In the UK, hospital admissions for dementia are usually informal unless there is evidence of dissent; this practice of taking lack of active dissent as evidence of consent now requires careful examination. A substantial proportion of patients with dementia will lack the capacity to consent to admission and/or treatment, probably numbering thousands3. Assessment there are two other categories continuing care5'6 and respite7 8 psychogeriatric admissions. The great majority of patients requiring continuing-care psychogeriatric admission will have dementia and will be unable to consent. Thus, they will require detention under section 3; and, since they may remain there for several years, annual renewals and mental health review tribunal hearings will be needed. Some patients may have the capacity to consent when they enter continuing care but lose this capacity later, as the severity of cognitive impairment increases. Thus, a mechanism for regular review of this capacity will be necessary. Detained patients who die are automatically subject to coroner s inquest. All continuing-care patients will eventually die and the relatives may therefore be exposed to additional stress at an emotive time. Moreover, many health authorities have purchased continuing-care beds in nursing homes that are not registered to admit patients under the Mental Health Act. Should the registration status of these facilities be altered to accommodate the judgment? If not, there will be a two-tiered system depending upon the nature of the local continuing-care provision admission under the Mental Health Act in one district, informal admission in another.
What about respite care? Should these patients be detained when the primary purpose of the admission is to provide a break for the carer, rather than assessment or treatment? There may not be sufficient evidence to fulfil the other criteria of the Mental Health Act. Moreover, such admissions are usually for 2 weeks every two to three months and thus these patients would require several mental health assessments a year. All these adjustments will have vast social, clinical and resource implications. DAY The NHS and social service resources are already overstretched and implementation of the Bournewood judgment will stretch them to the extreme. The Law Commission's 199511 proposals on mental incapacity, if implemented at last, would go some way towards relieving these strains. The report proposed the establishment of an incapacity jurisdiction to provide an integrated framework for decisions concerning personal welfare, health or financial matters of incapacitated persons. As with similar provisions concerning the Children Act 198912, the court was intended to be a jurisdiction of 'last resort in cases of dispute or controversy'. Only if the making of an order would be of greater benefit to the incapacitated person than no order would the court jurisdiction be invoked. The aim was to strike a balance between autonomy for incapacitated persons and intervention for their protection. In this respect the Law Commission assumed that informal admission would continue to be the norm for persons with dementia, autism, learning difficulties or other forms of mental incapacity, and this assumption is exactly what the Bournewood decision has overturned. 
CONCLUSION
The Law Commission proposals seem to us to strike a sensible balance between the rights of incapacitated patients and the duties of the clinician. The admission of most patients by means of the proposed incapacity jurisdiction would lessen burdens on the mental health tribunals, doctors and relatives. The Bournewood decision is probably legally correct, and previous practice erred in regarding the absence of dissent as equivalent to informed consent to treatment. Common law requires the giving of an informed consent by a competent adult, to avoid an action for battery. The presumption of competence must be actively rebutted for adults, and it may well be that previous practice was too lax. If the appeal to the House of Lords is upheld and the Bournewood principles are here to stay, we recommend that they be supplemented urgently with the provisions recommended by the Law Commission.
